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Comments
Redlining in Mortgage Lending:
California's Approach to
Getting the Red Out
The California State Legislature has recently declared that the subject of
housing is of vital statewide importance to the health, safety, and welfare of
the residents of this state.1 The legislature also declared that the national
housing goal of providing a decent home and a suitable living environment
for every American is a priority of the highest order.2 One of the obstacles to
achieving this goal, however, is that private lending institutions have been
unwilling or unable to commit sufficient funds for residential mortgage
financing in certain geographical areas throughout the state. 3 Mortgage
financing is denied in these areas regardless of the creditworthiness of the
individual loan applicant. This denial of mortgage financing makes the
decline of the affected neighborhoods inevitable, because the residents are
unable to sell their homes except to a buyer who can pay cash, and the
residents are also unable to obtain home improvement loans to maintain the
condition of their property. This practice by financial institutions of denying
mortgage financing because of the neighborhood in which the property is
located has been termed "redlining."
"Redlining" is defined as the policy of lending institutions either to
exclude certain geographical areas from consideration for home mortgages
and rehabilitation loans, or to vary the terms and conditions of such loans
within certain geographical areas. 4 The legislature has expressly recognized
that redlining exists in California. 5 In Section 42000 of the Health and
Safety Code, the legislature states that for reasons of prudent investment
policy, private financial institutions are not making mortgage financing
available for residential structures located in many older residential neigh-
I. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41001.
2. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41002. This national housing goal was adopted by the
legislature as it applies to California, with the accompanying commitment to "guide, encourage,
and direct where possible, the efforts of the private and public sectors of the economy to
cooperate and participate in the early attainment of a decent home and a satisfactory environ-
ment for every Californian." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41001 (emphasis added).
3. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41003(c).
4. Comment, Redlining: Potential Civil Rights and Sherman Act Violations Raised by
Lending Policies, 8 IND. L. REV. 1045 (1975).
5. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §42000.
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borhoods, or for certain housing developments occupied or intended to be
occupied by substantial numbers of low or moderate income families be-
cause of the perceived risks that such loans entail. In using the term
"perceived risks," the legislature is implicitly recognizing that, in fact,
such risks may or may not exist.
In the Health and Safety Code, the legislature also states that the lack of
mortgage financing in certain neighborhoods has caused and contributed to
deterioration of residential neighborhoods, inhibited local governments in
their attempts to arrest and reverse deterioration through local code enforce-
ment programs, and generally reduced or limited the supply of safe, decent,
and sanitary housing available to persons and families with low or moderate
income. 6 Lieutenant Governor Mervyn Dymally of California has stated the
effects of redlining in even stronger terms. 7 He stated that the practice of
redlining sounds the death knell for many of our inner cities. Not only does
it stop people from obtaining loans to purchase a house, but it also prevents
people from securing loans to improve the condition of their present home.
8
There is almost universal consensus that the availability of home loans is
essential to the preservation of California's existing housing stock.9 In fact,
the legislature has stated that in order to remedy the housing shortages which
exist in California, it will be necessary to make mortgage financing avail-
able in redlined areas.
10
The consensus collapses, however, when attempting to allocate the re-
sponsibilities and the risks of making mortgage financing available in
redlined areas.11 Public interest and community action groups place the
responsibility for resumption of mortgage lending on the financial institu-
tions, arguing that since the financial institutions have taken money out of
communities in the way of deposits, the financial institutions should now
reinvest that money by making local home loans rather than "disinvest" by
financing projects outside of the redlined communities.' 2 However, finan-
cial institutions have resisted the definition of the institution's lending
policies by public interest groups. The financial institutions look to the
government to cover any prospective loan applicant that the financial institu-
tion considers to be high-risk.
13
6. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §42000(a).
7. Special Hearings on Redlining Before the State of California Business and Transporta-
tion Agency [hereinafter cited as Redline Hearings], June 16, 1975, no. 1, at I (copy on file at
the Pacific Law Journal).
8. Id. Even if a person is lucky enough to secure a loan, it will be at a higher interest rate.
Dymally states that no one practice currently inflicts so much damage on the working of the
inner city as redlining. Redlining quashes the hope of people - the dream of someday owning
their own home and being able to say, "This is all mine." Id. at 1-2.
9. Comment, Urban Housing Finance and the Redlining Controversy, 25 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 110, 111 (1976).
10. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41003(c).
11. Comment, Urban Housing Finance and the Redlining Controversy, 25 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 110, 111 (1976).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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This comment will first examine what constitutes redlining, the effects of
redlining on a neighborhood, and the extent to which redlining exists in
California. The comment will then discuss the problems the public has in
obtaining information on redlining practices by financial institutions due to
the subtle nature of some of the practices. Recent legislation requiring
disclosure by financial institutions will be analyzed, and recommendations
will be made for simplifying the public disclosure process.
An examination of the legality of redlining under state law and federal
civil rights statutes will illustrate what can be done to eliminate redlining in
California. A determination will then be made whether financial institutions
can justify redlining practices by the affirmative defense of business necessi-
ty. The comment will conclude by examining what the State of California
has done to assist financial institutions in making loans in redlined areas.
EFFECTS OF REDLINING
Any discussion of redlining must necessarily begin with a definition of
redlining, an examination of its adverse effects, and a determination of the
extent to which redlining is practiced in California. The term "redlining"
originally referred to a financial institution's 14 alleged practice of drawing a
red line around an area on the map of a city and deciding that no funds
would be made available for that area. 15 The typical redlining process today
is not so graphic or demonstrable that a lender draws red lines on maps and
rules out any investment in those areas; the process is more subtle. 16 Today
a financial institution "redlines" a certain area within its service area
whenever it engages in any of the following practices: (1) refusal to accept
applications for loans or to grant loans secured by real property within the
designated area; (2) refusal to make a loan secured by real property within
the designated area unless the loan is guaranteed by some form of mortgage
insurance, either public (FHA or VA) or private; or (3) granting loans
secured by real property within the designated area only on more onerous
terms and conditions than those for loans on residential property outside the
designated area.17
Testimony at hearings conducted by the California Business and Trans-
portation Agency in 197518 [hereinafter referred to as Redline Hearings]
indicates that redlining is a widespread practice in this state, and that each of
the aforementioned practices is employed by California financial institu-
tions. 19 While representatives of lending institutions denied that loans were
14. "Financial institutions" in this context refers to savings and loan associations, banks,
mortgage companies or any other institution that regularly makes mortgage loans.
15. Comment, The Legality of Redlining Under the Civil Rights Laws, 25 AM. U.L. REv.
463, 465 (1976).
16. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 23, 1975, at 37.
17. Renne, Eliminating Redlining by Judicial Action: Are Erasers Available?, 29 VAND. L.
REV. 987, 990 (1976).
18. See note 7 supra.
19. E.g., Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 1, at 4-5, 16-19; Redline
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refused solely on the basis of geographic location, 20 a number of witnesses
testified that after identifying only the address or the zip code of their
property, they were told that no money was available for loans in that area.
21
Other witnesses also emphasized that loans are being denied solely because
of the location of the property.22
Financial institutions also engage in redlining by requiring that mortgage
loans be insured by FHA or VA rather than granting conventional loans.
23
At first glance, the substitution of insured loans, such as FHA loans, for
conventional loans may appear benign or even beneficial, since one might
believe that FHA insurance is enabling people who could not otherwise
afford conventional financing to receive loans and become homeowners.
24
While the occasional or moderate use of FHA mortgages might not be
detrimental to property values in a neighborhood, the extensive use of FHA
mortgages is a process that leads to the deterioration of some older neighbor-
hoods. The reason for the deterioration is that the value of property is
directly related to the availability and extent of mortgage financing, since
the typical buyer can afford to pay for property only the amount he can
borrow from a mortgage lender. The value of houses in an area receiving
little conventional lending may therefore decrease to conform to FHA loan
limits. Thus, a decision by lending institutions to shift from conventional to
FHA lending may quickly and dramatically decrease property values. 
5
Perhaps the most subtle method of redlining employed in California,
Hearings, supra note 7, June 23, 1975, at 11, 32-33, 37, 71. A study by the Center for New
Corporate Priorities on mortgage lending practices in Southern California indicates that in the
Los Angeles area, effectively one million people (or 14 percent of the population) reside in
redlined areas. The residents of these redlined areas have seven million dollars on deposit and if
the branch offices of savings and loans whose two-mile primary service area includes redlined
areas are included, the deposit figure is one and a half billion dollars. Despite this economic
power, these neighborhoods receive less than one percent of the single-family loans. Redline
Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no.1, at 4.
20. E.g., Roger Williams, representing Great Western Savings and Loan, testified, "[Wle
do not under any circumstances set aside an area because of lending problems as an area in
which we will not lend with the possible exception of very bad slide areas and very severe
subspil conditions." Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 2, at 7; Joe Angelo,
Vice-President for Urban Affairs, Bank of America, testified, "If I understand the expression'redlining' it simply means drawing a red line around a neighborhood and ruling it off limits for
real estate loans. This is just not done by the Bank of America." Redline Hearings, supra note
7, June 27, 1975, no. 3, at 1.
21. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, Dec. 5, 1975, at 103-05.
22. E.g., Redline Hearings, supra note 7, Dec. 12, 1975, at 41. One witness was told by a
lender in Oakland, "We don't lend anywhere east of Fruitvale Ave." The ironic part of this
situation was that while this property supposedly did not have any value to banks and savings
and loans, in the new assessed valuation, this same property was re-evaluated at a $2800
increase over the previous value. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 23, 1975, at 85.
23. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 1, at 18.
24. Id. at 18-19.
25. Id. A study done by the Community Information Project of the Western Center on
Law and Poverty indicates the effects of restricting an area to FHA insured loans. The study
indicated that heavy redlining was occurring in the Pasadena-Altadena area, which is not a"slummy community." These are homes that prior to redlining were selling for $100,000 in
many neighborhoods, but as soon as redlining began, the homes had their values artificially
dropped down to ceilings in the $40,000's. Id. at 17-18. One factor that may induce financial
institutions to take such action is the heavy influx of minorities into the neighborhood which the
institutions feel will cause an ultimate drop in property values.
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however, is granting loans in redlined areas only on more onerous terms and
conditions than those for loans in other areas. Testimony at the Redline
Hearings indicated that loans are typically available in any part of the city,
but the cost of the loans is variable.26 Some of the tactics used by financial
institutions in the course of this type of redlining include27 requiring higher
down payments than are usually required for financing comparable proper-
ty, 28 charging higher interest rates, 29 fixing earlier maturity dates and thus
making monthly payments higher, and fixing minimum amounts for loans
and thereby excluding lower priced property. Other tactics include stalling
on appraisals, setting appraisals below actual market value30 and thereby
requiring the borrower to come up with a higher down payment, applying
more rigid appraisal standards, refusing to lend on the basis of "presumed
economic obsolescence" regardless of the actual condition of the older
property, 31 and charging higher discount points on loans in redlined areas
than charged for comparable property in other areas in order to discourage
financing. 32 These tactics have the effect of discouraging mortgage financ-
ing in redlined areas, or even of making mortgage financing unavailable as a
practical matter, since residents of redlined areas are typically the least able
to afford these increased costs.
While the essence of redlining is geographical discrimination in home
loans, most definitions of redlining include two general categories. 33 Racial
redlining refers to policies or practices by which lending institutions dis-
criminate in the granting of, or in the setting of terms for, home loans based
on the perceived racial characteristics, determined by present or projected
occupants, of the neighborhood in which the borrower wishes to live.
Economic redlining refers to policies and practices of lenders that consider
certain geographical areas as zones of excessive risk, regardless of the
characteristics of the individual borrower or the property involved.34
26. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 23, 1975, at 37.
27. Comment, Redlining: Potential Civil Rights and Sherman Act Violations Raised by
Lending Policies, 8 IND. L. REV. 1045, 1045 n.2 (1975).
28. Testimony at the hearings indicated that in the Mission District of San Francisco (a
redlined area), the required down payments are as much as 20 percent higher than other areas of
the city. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 23, 1975, at 38.
29. Testimony at the hearings indicated that in East Los Angeles (a redlined area), the
interest rates ranged from 10 3/4 to 11 1/4 percent, as compared to 9 1/4 percent prevailing rate
across the rest of the city. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, Dec. 5, 1975, at 45.
30. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 23, 1975, at 38.
31. Comment, Redlining: Potential Civil Rights and Sherman Act Violations Raised by
Lending Policies, 8 IND. L. REV. 1045, 1045 n.2 (1975). The refusal to make loans on property
older than a certain age is a form of redlining even though it differs in concept from more
traditional redlining practices. This practice does not come within the traditional definition of
redlining because ostensibly it is not directed at an entire neighborhood. The net effect,
however, may be the same because the majority of homes may exceed the age classification,
thus effectively depriving that area of any source of mortgage money. Renne, Eliminating
Redlining by Judicial Action: Are Erasers Available?, 29 VAND. L. REv. 987, 990 (1976).
32. Testimony at the hearings indicated that in the Mission District of San Francisco (a
redlined area) the borrower will probably pay three points as opposed to a point or a point and a
half in Richmond. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 23, 1975, at 37-38.
33. Comment, Urban Housing Finance and the Redlining Controversy, 25 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 110, 110 n.1 (1976).
34. Id.
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Although financial institutions assert that only economic redlining occurs
in California, 35 studies done by consumer groups and by the California
Department of Savings and Loan indicate that racial redlining does exist in
California, in effect if not in intent.A6 Studies in Los Angeles indicate that
all-white areas receive twice as much mortgage money per capita as inte-
grated areas.37 Lending ranged from a low of one dollar per capita in the
hispanic neighborhoods to $125 per capita in areas with populations less
than five percent hispanic. Neighborhoods with less than a five percent
black population received $60 per person, while those with more than a 90
percent black population received less than two dollars per person.a8 Studies
in San Francisco and Alameda County indicated much the same pattern with
only minor variation. 39 Thus, it seems clear that California financial institu-
tions do engage in the practice of racial redlining.
DISCLOSURE OF LENDING PRACTICES
Before the problem of redlining can be attacked effectively on a statewide
basis, there must be disclosure by financial institutions to regulatory agen-
cies and to the public of their actual lending practices.40 Such disclosure is
essential to determine the true dimension of the redlining problem in
California. Public interest groups that have studied redlining practices assert
that problems such as redlining would not be likely to occur if all citizens
were completely informed of the institution's lending policies.
41
Public disclosure of redlining practices would also have several other
advantages.4 2 Disclosure would generate more widespread public interest in
efforts to control redlining, and this increased public awareness might result
in increased political pressure on the legislature and the regulatory agencies
to apply sanctions against institutions which engage in redlining. The
disclosed information on redlining practices would also provide plaintiffs
alleging discrimination in home financing in violation of the civil rights
statutes with sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation. Finally, local government officials, equipped with extensive infor-
35. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 2, at 4; Redline Hearings, supra
note 7, June 23, 1975, at 41-42.
36. E.g., Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 23, 1975, at 47, 53.
37. Id. at 53.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 47.
40. E.g., Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 1, at 34; Redline Hearings,
supra note 7, June 23, 1975, at 61, 80. There was evidence that even the simplest type of data
can sometimes be difficult to get. One consumer organization had to sue the Federal Reserve
Board and get a judgment before information would be disclosed on consumer interest rates for
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System - information which was public at the
local level for other banks. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 23, 1975, at 79.
41. If the citizens were informed, they could use the economic power of their pocket-
books and their votes to make desired changes. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 23, 1975,
at 81.
42. Comment, A Proposal for Eliminating Redlining: The Missouri Financial Institutions
Disclosure Act of 1976, 20 ST. Louis L.J. 722, 739 (1975).
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mation on the lending activities of local financial institutions, could exert
pressure on local lenders to invest in and help maintain city neighbor-
hoods.43 In the following section the extent to which the lending practices of
financial institutions are currently being disclosed to the regulatory agencies
in California will be examined, and needs for additional disclosure consist-
ent with the right to privacy of the individual borrower will be determined.
A. Current Disclosure Requirements
Although the California Department of Savings and Loan currently col-
lects more data on the mortgage lending practices of its associations than
any other state or federal agency, 44 there was testimony at the Redline
Hearings that this data is nevertheless insufficient to allow either the regula-
tory agencies 45 or the savings and loan institutions themselves 46 to determine
whether redlining exists within the institutions. 4' The testimony indicated
that this data has critical gaps, and more importantly, is not available to the
public.
48
However, the Redline Hearings that were conducted by California's
Business and Transportation Agency resulted in several measures to require
further disclosure by financial institutions. Effective August 1, 1976, the
Savings and Loan Commissioner adopted regulations requiring public dis-
closure of data on loans made after that date by all state-licensed savings and
loan associations. 49 These regulations have been termed the most com-
prehensive provisions of their type by one California consumer group.
50
The regulations require that the data on the Commissioner's monthly loan
register tapes, and copies of the tapes themselves, be made available to the
public.51 The data on these tapes includes information filed by savings and
loan associations on each real estate and home improvement loan made.
Information is also reported on loans purchased and sold, and on loan
applications denied. The data contained on the tapes relates to the charac-
teristics of the loan, of the property, and of the individual applicant or
applicants. The savings and loan making or denying the loan is identified.
52
Even though these tapes must be made available to the public, certain
information from the tape may be withheld if the Commissioner determines
the withholding of such information would be necessary to protect the right
43. See id.
44. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 23, 1975, at 54.
45. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, Dec. 5, 1975, at 38.
46. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 27, 1975, no. 3, at 23.
47. In the late 1960's, there was a system run by the Savings and Loan Commissioner's
office that provided every state savings and loan with a complete analysis of its lending program
by census tract and by loan type and gave a comparison with the industry's totals for every
census tract in the state. The system became too expensive to operate and was terminated in
1970. Id.
48. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 23, 1975, at 54.
49. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§242.2(t), 242.2(u), 245-246.7.
50. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, Dec. 5, 1975, at 14.
51. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §242.2(t).
52. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §242.2(t).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 8
to privacy of the individual borrower or applicant. 53 The drafters of the
regulations intended for this to be a very limited exception, however, and in
most cases, all of the data contained on the tapes would be made available to
the public. 54 In addition to requiring disclosure to the public, the regulations
issued by the Savings and Loan Commissioner also require disclosure to the
individual loan applicant of information that is designed to enable the
applicant to determine whether he has been the victim of discriminatory
lending practices.
55
The regulations also require the Savings and Loan Commissioner to
publish Fair Lending Reports "from time to time and at least annually.'"56
These Fair Lending Reports contain detailed breakdowns for each associa-
tion of information contained on the monthly loan register reports, as well as
an analysis by the Commissioner of lending patterns, and a summary of
complaints filed with the Commissioner alleging violations of the subchap-
ter of the regulations on fair lending.57 These regulations apply only to
state-chartered savings and loan associations, however, and thus do not
require disclosure of the lending practices of banks or mortgage com-
panies.
58
53. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §242.2(t).
54. See Redline Hearings, supra note 7, Dec. 5, 1975, at 85-87.
55. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.4. Testimony at the Redline Hearings emphasized that in
dealing with borrowers in redlined areas, it is especially important to create an awareness on the
part of the individual applicants that they have a right to challenge the financial institution's
decision. Since borrowers in redlined areas are often the least able to understand how to
borrow, they are easily discouraged when faced with the obstacle that the more educated or
refined individual might be willing to fight. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, Dec. 5, 1975, at 66.
The regulations themselves only require disclosure to the loan applicant by state-licensed
savings and loan associations, 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.4, but a bill was introduced in the
California Legislature on Dec. 6, 1976 that would require similar disclosure by banks, mortgage
brokers, or any other institution that regularly makes mortgage loans. SB 3, 1977-78 Regular
Session (proposed addition of §1788.01 et seq. to the Civil Code) (as amended Feb. 9, 1977).
56. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §242.2(u).
57. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §242.2(u).
58. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§242.2(t), (u), 245-246.7. A bill was introduced in the California
Legislature on Dec. 6, 1976, SB 6, 1977-78 Regular Session, that would require banks to compile
information related to housing loans and to forward that information to the Superintendent of
Banks, SB 6, 1977-78 Regular Session (proposed addition of §1932(a) to the Financial Code) (as
amended Mar. 3, 1977). (Even with SB 6, mortgage companies would apparently still be exempt
from disclosure requirements). This information is also to be made available for public inspec-
tion at each office of the bank. The information required would be similar to that required by
the existing regulations of the Savings and Loan Commissioner. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE
§§242.2(t), (u), 245-246.7. SB 6 would also require public disclosure by savings and loan
associations of their mortgage lending practices. SB 6, 1977-78 Regular Session (proposed
addition of §§5253, 8707.3 to the Financial Code) (as amended Mar. 3, 1977). Thus, if SB 6
becomes law, it will supersede the Savings and Loan Commissioner's regulations on the same
topic, since the Savings and Loan Commissioner is given authority to promulgate regulations
not inconsistent with state law, CAL. FIN. CODE §5255, and SB 6 would be an inconsistent state
law. Pursuant to the SB 6 provisions, the Savings and Loan Commissioner will be required to
publish reports quarterly rather than "from time to time and at least annually." SB 6, 1977-78
Regular Session (proposed addition of §5253 to the Financial Code) (as amended Mar. 3, 1977);
10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §242.2(u). This change would thus guarantee that the public has access to
data on the lending practices of financial institutions on a timely basis.
SB 6, however, may make a more significant undesirable change in the form in which data is
required to be disclosed to the public. Under the current regulations, the loan register tapes
themselves may be copied and made available to the public for the cost of copying. 10 CAL.
ADMIN. CODE §242.2(u). SB 6 would appear to require only the Commissioner's reports or
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In addition to the savings and loan regulations currently requiring disclo-
sure, provisions have been added to the Health and Safety Code to require
the compilation of data which will assist in identifying redlining practices.
59
The main thrust of this legislation, known as the Zenovich-Moscone-
Chacon Housing and Home Finance Act, is to create the California Housing
Finance Agency.60 This Act also makes the Department of Housing and
Community Development responsible for developing a California Statewide
Housing Plan. 61 This Plan will contain an evaluation and summary of
housing conditions throughout the state with particular emphasis on the
availability of housing for all economic segments of the state. 62 The Plan
will also include an identification of market constraints and obstacles, and
specific recommendations for their removal. 63 In this provision, the Depart-
ment is thus given the responsibility for identifying areas where redlining is
occurring and documenting these areas in the Statewide Housing Plan.
64
Once the Plan is developed, the Department of Housing and Community
Development is directed to make "[s]ufficient copies . . .available for
distribution to concerned persons throughout the state.''65 Thus, the
Statewide Housing Plan will be another vehicle through which redlining
practices of financial institutions will be disclosed to the public.
As the previous discussion indicates, California currently requires disclo-
sure of data on mortgage lending practices by a number of state departments
and agencies,66 and bills which are currently in the legislature would require
disclosure by a number of financial institutions and state agencies that are
copies of the reports to be made available to the public. SB 6, 1977-78 Regular Session
(proposed addition of §8707.3 to the Financial Code) (as amended Mar. 3, 1977). For public
interest groups planning to do studies based on this data, the difference could be critical, since
information summarized in one manner is often impossible to summarize in a different manner.
The information that the Savings and Loan Commissioner is required to disclose under SB 6
would appear to be in a highly summarized form. SB 6, 1977-78 Regular Session (proposed
addition of §8707.3 to the Financial Code) (as amended Mar. 3, 1977). Thus, SB 6 might be a
much more effective tool in the disclosure of redlining data if the loan register tapes them-
selves, in addition to the summarized reports, were made available to the public. Certain data
could still be deleted from the tapes in the limited number of instances where deletion is
necessary to protect the loan applicant's right to privacy.
59. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41000 et seq. (effective Sept. 26, 1975).
60. The Act also continued the existence of the California Department of Housing and
Community Development. Otherwise, the Department would have been operative only until the
61st day after final adjournment of the 1976 Regular Session of the California Legislature. AB
1, 1st Extra. Session 1975-76, Legislative Counsel's Digest, at 2.
61. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41125.
62. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41126(a).
63. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41126(d).
64. The Plan should also contain recommendations for state and other public and private
actions which will contribute to the attainment of housing goals established for California. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41126(f). The Plan will be revised annually and submitted to the
legislature for adoption. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41127. The Department of Housing and
Community Development is also directed to establish a statewide housing information system,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41132, and is given authority to provide a statistics and research
service for the collection and dissemination of information affecting housing and community
development. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41131.
65. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41129.
66. California financial institutions may also be subject to the disclosure requirements of
the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation which were effec-
tive March 25, 1977. L.A. Daily J., April 1, 1977, at 1, col. 4; at 2, col. 3.
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not currently required to disclose data to the public. There is wide variation,
however, in the types of data collected by the various agencies and in the
form in which the data is disclosed to the public. Some agencies disclose
data on a very detailed level,67 while others disclose data in a summary
form. 68 The sheer number of statutes and regulations requiring disclosure of
various types of data will present an additional problem for the consumer or
regulatory agency interested in obtaining data on statewide lending prac-
tices. The existing statutes and potential statutes requiring disclosure are
scattered among the Health and Safety Code,69 the Civil Code, 70 and the
Financial Code, 71 while the Savings and Loan Commissioner's regulations
are contained in the Administrative Code.72 Thus, even though California
has very extensive disclosure requirements for financial institutions, there
may be some problem disseminating to consumers or regulatory agencies all
of the information that is available, since the information is available from a
number of diverse sources.
B. Recommendations on Disclosure of Lending Practices
In order for a truly comprehensive picture of mortgage lending practices
to emerge, it would seem reasonable to require all data related to housing
finance to be collected and disclosed to the public through one central
source. Since the Department of Housing and Community Development is
already authorized to provide a statistics and research service for collection
and dissemination of housing information, 73 and since the Department is
also directed to establish a statewide housing information system, 74 the
Department would be the logical repository for such data. The data currently
provided by banks and savings and loan associations to their regulatory
agencies could be provided to the Department of Housing and Community
Development as well.
The requirement of a central source for all data related to housing finance
would have several advantages. First, data would be available to the public
from a central source. Consumers interested in obtaining data on statewide
lending practices would be more likely to become informed of all data that is
available.75 Second, having all data available at the Department of Housing
and Community Development would provide the type of data base that
67. E.g., Department of Savings and Loan, 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §242.2(t), (u).
68. E.g., Department of Housing and Community Development, CAL, HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §41129.
69. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41129.
70. SB 3, 1976-77 Regular Session (proposed addition of §1788.01 et seq. to the Civil
Code) (as amended Feb. 9, 1977).
71. E.g., SB 6, 1976-77 Regular Session (proposed addition of §1932 to the Financial
Code) (as amended Mar. 3, 1977).
72. E.g., 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §242.2(t), (u).
73. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41131.
74. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41132.
75. The logistics of traveling to the head office of every bank in the state or even the
requirement of visiting many state agencies to compile statewide information on housing would
discourage public involvement and would be unnecessarily time-consuming and expensive.
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would enable the Department to compile a meaningful Statewide Housing
Plan. Third, the collection of all data relating to housing finance at the
Department would facilitate the development of regulations identifying
priority areas for the Housing Finance Agency.76 Fourth, reports provided to
the public could be produced in one format rather than in the variety of
formats that will result from disclosure by individual financial institutions.
Last, numbering systems or coding systems would be uniform and data
collected from diverse sources could be correlated readily. Thus, establish-
ment of one central source for the collection and dissemination of data on
lending practices of financial institutions would serve to streamline the
disclosure process from a consumer standpoint and would serve to insure
that the state agencies involved consider all relevant information when
making decisions regarding housing finance.
LEGAL BASES FOR CHALLENGING REDLINING
Although a variety of legislation designed to control redlining practices
has been introduced, there is currently no California statute that expressly
makes redlining illegal. Moreover, existing California law would appear to
directly sanction redlining, since Section 7176 of the Financial Code pro-
vides that the Savings and Loan Commissioner may "prohibit an associa-
tion from making further loans within any geographic area where the
making of future loans would constitute an unsound business practice."
77
Rather than sanctioning redlining, however, the Savings and Loan Commis-
sioner has issued a comprehensive set of regulations representing the only
California law directly addressing the problem of redlining and related
discriminatory mortgage lending practices.
78
In addition to the regulations, the racial redlining practices of financial
institutions may arguably be challenged under a number of state and federal
76. The Department of Housing and Community Development may propose regulations
to be adopted by the Housing Finance Agency which designate geographical areas of need
throughout the state for housing construction or rehabilitation as identified in the California
Statewide Housing Plan. These regulations should identify housing markets in which insuffi-
cient financing is available for purchase or rehabilitation of existing housing. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §41137(g). Regulations may also be proposed by the Housing Finance Agency in
this area, but they will not take effect without concurrence of the Director of the Department of
Housing and Community Development or the Secretary of the Business and Transportation
Agency. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41137.
77. CAL. FIN. CODE §7176.
78. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§145.7, 147.6, 204.2(q), 242.2(t), (u), 245-246.7. These regula-
tions, which went into effect on August 1, 1976, were issued pursuant to the general authority to
promulgate rules and regulations which is vested in the Savings and Loan Commissioner by
CAL. FIN. CODE §5255. As long as these regulations do not conflict with other statutory
provisions, they will carry the force and effect of law. The only statute the regulations might
possibly conflict with would be CAL. FIN. CODE §7176. However, §7176 merely permits the
Savings and Loan Commissioner to authorize redlining if this is required by sound business
practice rather than requiring redlining. Since the regulations themselves permit redlining if the
association can demonstrate that it is necessary in a particular case to avoid an unsafe or
unsound business practice, there would appear to be no conflict between the regulations and
CAL. FIN. CODE §7176.
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civil rights statutes. 79 In California, the Unruh Civil Rights Act 80 and the
Rumford Fair Housing Act8l may be applicable to racial redlining. On the
federal level, the Civil Rights Act of 1866,82 the Fair Housing Act of
1968,83 and the Civil Rights Act of 196484 may provide bases for challeng-
ing redlining practices. Determining which of these statutes is applicable in
a given situation may depend on the race of the borrower, the racial
composition of the neighborhood in which redlining is alleged and the
presence or absence of government insurance for the loan. There is also
considerable overlap in applicability of the statutes, and the statute that is
primarily relied on by the borrower in an individual situation may depend on
the remedies available under each statute. This section will examine the
applicability of the regulations and the civil rights statutes as legal grounds
for challenging redlining practices.
A. The California Regulations
The administrative regulations promulgated by the Savings and Loan
Commissioner are currently limited in their applicability to state-licensed
savings and loan associations. 85 The state-licensed savings and loan associa-
tions that are subject to the regulations make approximately one-third of all
mortgage loans made in California. 8 6 No similar regulations currently exist
for other types of financial institutions, such as banks or mortgage com-
panies. 87 The regulations are also limited to redlining which occurs in the
consideration of loans for the purchase of one to four family properties by
owner-occupants, and loans for refinancing with improvement. 8
1. Substance of the California Regulations
Even though the administrative regulations do not pertain to all financial
institutions and to loans for all types of property, the regulations are
79. These statutes would also apply to the savings and loan associations that are covered
by the administrative regulations since statutes take precedence over administrative regulations
on the same topic. See, e.g., Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 733, 433 P.2d 697, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689
(1967).
80. CAL. CIV. CODE §51.
81. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §35700 et seq.
82. 42 U.S.C. §1982 (1970).
83. 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq. (1970).
84. 42 U.S.C. §2000d et seq. (1970).
85. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245(c)(4).
86. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, Dec. 12, 1975, at 4.
87. There is a bill that was introduced on December 16, 1976, that would take the
substance of these regulations, including the establishment of the boards of inquiry, and make
them applicable to a wider range of financial institutions. The financial institutions that would
be covered by the bill include any bank, savings and loan association, mortgage broker, or other
institution in this state, including a state or local public agency, that regularly makes, arranges,
or purchases loans for the purchase, construction, rehabilitation, improvement, or refinancing
of housing accomodations, and includes the officers and agents of such institutions or agencies.
AB 79, 1977-78 Regular Session) (as introduced Dec. 16, 1976).
88. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.1(d), (f. However, the Commissioner has stated his
intention to develop standards and guidelines necessary to expand the coverage of the regula-
tions. Letter from Saul Perlis, Savings and Loan Commissioner, to all state-licensed savings
and loan associations, July 2, 1976, at 4 (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
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comprehensive in scope, and they have served as a model for proposed
legislation in this area. 89 In addition to requiring disclosure to individuals
and to the public, 90 the regulations prohibit certain restrictive lending prac-
tices based on neighborhood factors91 and require affirmative action by the
saving and loan associations in order to increase the extent of lending in
redlined areas. 92 The regulations also establish boards of inquiry to review
individual complaints concerning redlining.
93
The major thrust of the regulations is contained in the subchapter on fair
lending. 94 The purposes of this subchapter include prevention of discrimina-
tion in home lending because of the conditions, characteristics or trends in
the neighborhood or geographical area surrounding the property, and in-
ducement of more lending in areas and to groups that have previously been
deprived of mortgage financing. 95 At the same time, however, the regula-
tions add a major qualification to their proscription of redlining practices by
requiring that the prevention be consistent with sound business practice .96
This qualification, depending on its interpretation, may render the balance
of the regulations virtually ineffective in controlling redlining practices.
However, in discussing this qualification in the subchapter on fair lending,
the Commissioner expressly declared that:
in determining whether and under what terms and conditions to
make mortgage loans, associations have sometimes discriminated
based on consideration of neighborhood factors in a manner not
required as a matter of sound business practice . . . .97
The Commissioner also stated that this discrimination has often been arbit-
rary, and has caused or contributed to the decline of available livable
housing in the affected areas. 98 Furthermore, the Commissioner acknowl-
edged that the practice of discriminating in mortgage lending on the basis of
89. Legislation modeled on the regulations include AB 79, SB 3, SB 6, SB 7, 1977-78
Regular Session.
90. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §242.2(t), (u).
91. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.2.
92. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§147.6, 245.5. Each association is also required to maintain on
file with the Commissioner a document describing the marketing policies and programs of the
association. In describing the elements of its marketing program, the association is directed to
give special emphasis to the extent to which such information relates to affirmative programs
by the association designed to market services, including the making of loans, to groups
protected by the regulations and to residents and potential residents of various neighborhoods.
10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.5. The regulations also provide that in reaching a decision on
applications for new branch offices, the Commissioner may consider, among other things, the
extent of compliance with the subchapter of the regulations on Fair Lending, the extent to which
the association's present and anticipated marketing policies and programs affirmatively further
the purposes of the subchapter on Fair Lending, and information on the association's affirma-
tive action programs received pursuant to §147.5. Consideration of Fair Lending and Affirma-
tive Action Programs will be given special emphasis when there are competing applications for
a branch facility. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §147.6(b).
93. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.7.
94. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE, Subchapter 23 (commencing with §245).
95. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245(b).
96. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245(b), See text accompanying note 104 infra.
97. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245(c)(5).
98. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245(C)(5)(A), (B).
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neighborhood factors has also had a sharp discriminatory effect against
racial and ethnic minorities.
99
After acknowledging the history of redlining, the regulations then pro-
ceed to expressly prohibit redlining by providing that:
No association shall deny a mortgage loan, or discriminate in
application procedures or in the setting of terms or conditions of
any such loan, due, in whole or in part, to consideration of the
conditions, characteristics or trends in the neighborhood or geog-
raphic area surrounding the security property, unless the associa-
tion can demonstrate that such consideration in the particular case
is required to avoid an unsafe or unsound business practice.100
In an effort to keep the regulation's "unsafe or unsound business prac-
tice" exception from becoming an exception that swallows the rule, an
entire subchapter was included in the regulations entitled "Guidelines Relat-
ing to Fair Lending."°10 The guidelines emphasize that the strong intent of
the regulations is that associations should be making every effort to find and
to make the sound loans that can be made in historically redlined areas and
that an association's compliance with the regulations will be reviewed in this
light. 102 The guidelines then set forth detailed examples of policies and
practices that will be considered discriminatory in effect and unnecessary to
achieve an overriding legitimate business purpose. 03
If the guidelines and the regulations are enforced in the same spirit of
controlling redlining practices wherever possible in which they were
enacted, they may represent a significant first step in making savings and
loan associations accountable for discriminatory loan practices. The regula-
tions, however, appear to allow the lender to apply inherently subjective
criteria in determining whether the loan will be granted, such as "future
market value" of the property.'04 The use of such subjective criteria to
justify denial of a loan could defeat the entire purpose of the regulations,
since it is very difficult to prove the reasonableness of subjective value
judgments. If an association can document that the fair market value of the
property is likely to decrease during the early years of the mortgage term,
then the association may deny the loan or may make an adjustment in the
loan to value ratio, 10 thereby increasing the down payment required by the
borrower. The association may also require that a shorter term to maturity be
used, 0 6 thereby increasing the borrower's monthly payment. Under the
guidelines, then, documentation of decreasing fair market value, real or
99. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245(c)(6).
100. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.2(a).
101. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE, Subchapter 24 (commencing with §246).
102. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §246.1(b)(5).
103. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §246.1(a).
104. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.3(b).
105. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.3(b)(1).
106. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.3(b)(2).
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alleged, would allow the savings and loan association to redline with
impunity. The real danger with allowing the association to use future fair
market value to justify refusal to make a loan is that the financial institu-
tion's decision is likely to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 107 When the
financial institution decides that an area is declining, no money is available
in that area for maintaining or improving property, and the future decline of
the area becomes inevitable.
2. Enforcement of the California Regulations
The initial interpretation of the extent to which the regulations may be
used to control redlining practices will be the responsibility of the two
boards of inquiry that were created by the regulations. 108 The boards will
review complaints of alleged regulatory violations which the Savings and
Loan Commissioner falls to resolve in 21 days.109 With respect to each
complaint reviewed, the board will make a finding of fact regarding whether
there has been discrimination in mortgage lending, or redlining, in violation
of the regulations or applicable provisions of law. All regulatory violations
will be reported to the Secretary of the Business and Transportation Agency,
with a copy of the report to the Savings and Loan Commissioner, for such
action as the Agency Secretary deems appropriate. 110 Under Section 9000 of
the Financial Code, the Secretary could order an association to make a loan,
since Section 9000, when read in conjunction with other statutes, gives the
Secretary authority to "direct a discontinuance of such violations or unsafe
or injurious practices and a conformity with all the requirements of law." 111
B. Statutory Control of Redlining Practices
For loans made by financial institutions other than state-chartered savings
107. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 1, at 5.
108. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.7(a). The boards of inquiry are established in the City of
Los Angeles and the City and County of San Francisco, and in such other locations as the
Secretary of the Business and Transportation Agency may designate. Id. Each board of inquiry
will be composed of a public member, a representative of the savings and loan industry, and an
employee of the Business and Transportation Agency or one of the departments within the
Agency. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.7(c).
109. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.7(b).
110. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.7(i).
111. CAL. FIN. CODE §9000. Section 9000 actually gives the Savings and Loan Commis-
sioner authority to require the association to make the loan, but under CAL. GOV'T CODE
§13978, the Secretary of the Business and Transportation Agency may exercise any power
vested in any department within the Agency. A bill was introduced in the California Legislature
on Dec. 6, 1976, that would expand the enforcement powers of the boards of inquiry. SB 7,
1977-78 Regular Session (proposed addition of §35800 et seq. to the Health and Safety Code) (as
amended Feb. 9, 1977). Under the provisions of SB 7, the boards of inquiry would be given the
same enforcement powers that the Agency Secretary has under the regulations. SB 7, 1977-78
Regular Session (proposed addition of §35834 to the Health and Safety Code) (as amended Feb.
9, 1977). In addition, if the board finds a pattern of discrimination, it may: (1) recommend that
the State Treasurer disqualify the institution from receiving deposits of state funds; (2) recom-
mend to regulatory agencies that affirmative marketing or lending programs be established; or
(3) recommend to appropriate government agencies that the institution's loans not be eligible
for purchase or insurance. SB 7, 1977-78 Regular Session (proposed addition of §35836 to the
Health and Safety Code) (as amended Feb. 9, 1977). SB 7 would thus considerably expand the
sanctions that may be taken against an institution that engages in redlining practices.
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and loans,' 12 there is no state law specifically addressing redlining practices.
However, California's Unruh Civil Rights Act" 3 and Rumford Fair Housing
Act 14 prohibit discrimination in housing, and these statutes may be applied
to redlining practices under certain circumstances. Federal laws, including
the Civil Rights Act of 1866,115 the Fair Housing Act of 1968,116 and the
Civil Rights of 1964,117 have also been applied to discrimination in housing.
These federal and state laws may provide the basis for successfully challeng-
ing redlining practices by any financial institution, even those that are also
subject to the regulations of the Savings and Loan Commissioner. 
118
Since the aforementioned statutes prohibit discrimination based on race,
an initial inquiry relevant to the statutes' applicability to redlining would be
whether the discrimination prohibited must be discrimination based on an
intentional consideration of race as a factor, or whether a practice which
results in discrimination based on race will constitute a violation of one of
these statutes. This inquiry is relevant since it will determine the type of
evidence that must be produced by a borrower in a redlined area to establish
that the statute has been violated.
Concerning the federal statutes, Shannon v. United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development'19 examined the changes in the plaintiff's
burden of proof in cases alleging discrimination in housing. 120 By 1974,
it was well established by the federal circuit courts that the burden of
proof in housing discrimination cases is governed by the concept of the
"prima facie case." 121 In order to establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination, the plaintiff need prove no more than that the conduct of the
defendant actually or predictably results in racial discrimination: in other
words, that it has a racially discriminatory effect. 22 The plaintiff need make
no showing whatsoever that the action resulting in racial discrimination was
racially motivated. Effect, and not purpose, is the touchstone.12 Once the
plaintiff has established a prima facie case by demonstrating racially dis-
112. "Other financial institutions" are primarily banks and mortgage companies.
113. CAL. CIV. CODE §51.
114. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §35700 et seq.
115. 42 U.S.C. §1982 (1970).
116. 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq. (1970).
117. 42 U.S.C. §2000d et seq. (1970).
118. See note 79 supra.
119. 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
120. Id. at 816-21.
121. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1042 (1975), rehearing denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975) (action brought under 42 U.S.C. §3601
et seq.). See also Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1021, 419 U.S. 1027 (1974) (action brought under 42 U.S.C. §§1981, 1982, and 42 U.S.C. §3604);
United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir.
1974) (action brought under 42 U.S.C. §§1981, 1982, 1983 and 42 U.S.C. §3604); Barrick Realty,
Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974) (action brought under 42 U.S.C. §3604);United
States v. Pelzer Realty Co., Inc., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974)
(action brought under 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq.); Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970)
(action brought under 42 U.S.C. §2000d and 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq.).
122. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974).
123. Id. at 1185.
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criminatory effect, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that its
conduct was necessary to promote some compelling interest.124
The continued viability of this concept of the plaintiff's burden of proof of
racially discriminatory effect was put somewhat in question when the United
States Supreme Court decided the employment discrimination case of
Washington v. Davis1"5 in 1976. In that case, the testing procedures of a
police department were challenged under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment and under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.126 The Washington
Court held that a mere showing that the defendant's actions had a racially
discriminatory impact was not sufficient, in and of itself, to establish a
racially discriminatory purpose.1 17 The Washington opinion thus makes it
clear that racial impact is to be considered only as one factor in determining
whether there was a racially discriminatory purpose.
However, the Washington opinion dealt primarily with a challenge to the
validity of the employment test under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. The Court held that racially differential impact was not the
constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of racial discrimination.
128
Thus, Washington may not affect the type of evidence that will be sufficient
to establish a prima facie case in an action brought under a federal statute. 129
Washington was also an employment discrimination case, and it was
distinguished in Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo,130 a later district court
case involving discrimination in housing. In Rizzo, the court emphasized
that prior to Washington, it was well established that proof of racial impact
was all that was necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in
housing cases. 131 The Rizzo court relied on the legislative history and
remedial purpose of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 in concluding that proof
of racial impact should be sufficient. 132
Following the reasoning of Rizzo, it may be argued that proof of racial
impact should be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of violation of any
124. Id.
125. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
126. Id. at 233. 42 U.S.C. §1981 (1970).
127. 426 U.S. at 239. In rejecting the adequacy of discriminatory impact alone to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination, the Court did state that disproportionate racial impact is
relevant to prove a discriminatory purpose since discriminatory purpose can often be inferred
from the totality of the relevant facts. Id. at 241-42. Mr. Justice Stevens, in his concurring
opinion, stated that frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence
of what actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the
actor, since normally the actor will be presumed to have intended the natural consequences of
his acts. Id. at 253.
128. Id. at 239.
129. The Court did state, "We have never held that the constitutional standard for ad-
judicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under
Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964], and we decline to do so today." Id. The fact that the
Court did not discuss the standard that was applicable under the federal statute would indicate
that they intended to leave the previously existing standard in that area undisturbed.
130. No. 71-1575 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 1976).
131. Id.
132. Id.
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of the federal or state civil rights statutes. The legislative history of the
federal Fair Housing Act of 1968 provides the primary reason for requiring
the plaintiff in a redlining action to prove only racial impact rather than
racial purpose. 133 If residents of a redlined area are predominantly minority
group members, a policy of denying mortgage money to that area will have
the same effect of discriminating against those individuals as would a refusal
to lend based on their race or color. 13 4 Since the prevention of discrimination
of this type was one of the primary reasons for enacting a civil rights statute
governing housing discrimination, 135 it may be argued that the plaintiff in
any redlining action, state or federal, should be given the benefit of proving
only discriminatory impact rather than purpose, and thereby shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant after a prima facie case of discriminatory
impact has been shown. In the following sections, each of the state and
federal civil rights statutes will be examined to determine what other proof a
plaintiff challenging redlining practices must offer to establish a violation of
the statutes.
1. California Statutes
There is no California statute that expressly prohibits discrimination
based on the geographical location of the property offered as security for a
mortgage loan, although there are several bills in the current session of the
legislature that will do so if passed. 136 However, if redlining practices by
financial institutions are the equivalent of discrimination based on sex, race,
color, religion, ancestry or national origin, then these redlining practices
may be challenged under either the Unruh Civil Rights Act 137 or the
Rumford Fair Housing Act. 
138
In order to bring redlining practices within the scope of one of these
statutes, the plaintiff would have to show that the neighborhood being
redlined is composed primarily of persons in one of the groups that are
protected by the statutes. Typically, a neighborhood being redlined will be
composed of members of a racial minority, such as blacks. Consequently,
minority group members are the ones primarily affected by the discrimina-
tion, and discrimination based on the location of the property becomes the
functional equivalent of discrimination against members of a protected
group. Redlining practices could thus arguably be challenged under either
the Unruh Civil Rights Act or the Rumford Fair Housing Act.
133. Id.
134. Comment, The Legality of Redlining Under the Civil Rights Laws, 25 AM. U.L. REv.
463, 476 (1976).
135. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq. (1970).
136. E.g., SB 7 (as amended Feb. 9, 1977), AB 79 (as introduced Dec. 16, 1976), 1977-78
Regular Session.
137. CAL. CIv. CODE §51.
138. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §35700 et seq.
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a. Unruh Civil Rights Act
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act provides that:
all persons . . .no matter what their sex, race, color, religion,
ancestry or national origin are entitled to the full and equal accom-
modations, advantages, facilities, privileges or services in all busi-
ness establishments of every kind whatsoever. 139
In Holmes v. Bank of America, 140 Bank of America's refusal to grant a loan
solely on the basis of the applicant's race was challenged under the Unruh
Civil Rights Act. Bank of America argued that the Unruh Act does not
require a national bank to lend its money on a non-discriminatory basis; that
"no one has a right granted by law or otherwise to demand that a bank grant
him a loan; [and] that a bank may refuse, in its own discretion, to make a
loan for any reason or for no reason at all. . ,,.4I The Bank also argued
that even though the Unruh Act applies to "all business establishments of
every kind whatsoever," the legislature did not intend for the Act to apply to
every type of business transaction whatsoever, since only certain types of
transactions are listed in the Act itself.142 The Bank further argued that since
a loan is a contract, and since no person has a right to compel another to
enter into a contract with him without the other's consent, the loan transac-
tion falls within the express legislative exception to the Unruh Act.143
The court in Holmes did not directly address the validity of the Bank's
argument, since the lower court's decision was reversed on other
grounds. 144 It would seem, however, that the Bank's argument that no one
can be compelled to enter into a contract against his will would apply
equally to the case of a restaurant or motel owner refusing service solely on
the basis of the patron's race, and yet this is precisely the type of discrimina-
tion the Unruh Act was designed to proscribe. The fact that a bank could
refuse to make a loan "for any reason or for no reason at all" prior to
enactment of the Unruh Act does not mean that they may continue to do so
in spite of the Unruh Act. The legislature's use of general language such as
''privileges or services" rather than enumeration of a more specific list of
business transactions would seem to indicate that the Unruh Act was in-
tended to apply to a broad range of business transactions. It would also seem
that if the legislature had intended to except such an important group of
transactions as "all financial transactions" or "all contracts" from the
Unruh Act, then the legislature would have been more explicit in doing so.
139. CAL. CIV. CODE §51 (emphasis added).
140. 216 Cal. App. 2d 529, 30 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1963).
141. Id. at 535, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
142. Id.
143. Id. The exception to the Unruh Act provides, "This section shall not be construed to
confer any right or privilege on a person which is conditioned or limited by law. CAL.
CIV. CODE §51.
144. 216 Cal. App. 2d at 535-36, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
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Thus, it is arguable that a financial institution conducting a lending business
is a "business establishment" engaged in providing "services" within the
meaning of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
In order to challenge the redlining practices of a financial institution under
the Unruh Act, a plaintiff must first show that the neighborhood being
redlined is composed primarily of members of a group protected by the Act,
such as blacks. Since minority group members are the ones primarily
affected by the redlining practices of financial institutions, the discrimina-
tion based on the location of the property becomes the functional equivalent
of discrimination based on race. Thus, since blacks would not be obtaining
"full and equal. . services" in a "business establishment," 145 the Unruh
Civil Rights Act could be used to challenge the redlining practices of
financial institutions.
b. Rumford Fair Housing Act
The Rumford Fair Housing Act'16 declares that discrimination in housing
accommodations in California is against public policy. The Rumford Act
also specifically states that it is unlawful for a financial institution to
discriminate in the terms, conditions or privileges related to obtaining
financial assistance because of the race, color, religion, sex, marital status,
national origin, or ancestry of the borrower or of prospective occupants and
tenants. 147 The Fair Employment Practices Commission is given authority to
enforce the provisions of the Act. 148 If the Commission finds there has been
a violation of the Rumford Act, it has the power to issue orders requiring
respondent to cease and desist from such practices. 1
49
The Rumford Fair Housing Act would appear to cover racial redlining
since racial redlining is discrimination based on the perceived racial charac-
teristics, determined by present or projected occupants, of the neighborhood
in which the borrower wishes to live.' 50 The Rumford Act specifically
prohibits discrimination because of the race of the borrower or of the
prospective occupants or tenants of the property.' 5 ' The term "property"
would probably be broadly construed to encompass residents of the neigh-
borhood surrounding the security property rather than only residents of the
security property itself. Borrowers who feel they have been the victims of
racial redlining could thus file complaints with the Fair Employment Prac-
tices Commission. The Commission would appear to have the authority to
145. CAL. CIV. CODE §51.
146. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §35700 et seq.
147. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §35720(7).
148. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §35730.5.
149. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §35738.
150. Comment, Urban Housing Finance and the Redlining Controversy, 25 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 110, 110 n.1 (1976).
151. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §35720(7).
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require the financial institution to make the loan if this were the only way the
financial institution could "cease and desist" from the injurious practice.
2. Federal Civil Rights Statutes
There is no federal statute that expressly prohibits discrimination based on
the geographical location of the property offered as security for a mortgage
loan. However, there are a number of federal statutes prohibiting discrimi-
nation on the basis of race, including the Civil Rights Act of 1866,152 the
Fair Housing Act of 1968,153 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.154 Since
racial redlining is discrimination against the residents of an entire neighbor-
hood on the basis of the racial composition of the neighborhood, these
statutes arguably may be used to control racial redlining practices. The
provisions of each of the aforementioned federal statutes will be examined
to determine the circumstances under which each would be useful in con-
trolling redlining practices.
a. Civil Rights Act of 1866
In 1866 Congress appointed a "Joint Committee of Fifteen" to deter-
mine if blacks in southern states continued to be victims of discrimination
after the Civil War. 155 The Committee concluded that although statutory
discrimination was almost eliminated, the prejudices of private persons
remained intact. 156 To abolish the effects of this private prejudice, Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866.157 Section 1982 of the Act provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal
property. 158
Although this language was available for many decades, it did not render
its fullest protection to minority citizens until 1968 when the Supreme Court
decided Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 159 In that case the Supreme Court
held that Section 1982 reached beyond state action to operate on unofficial
acts of private individuals." 6 The Court reasoned that since Section 1982
was derived from the thirteenth amendment, it was aimed at eliminating
private as well as state discrimination. 161 This interpretation of Section 1982
152. 42 U.S.C. §1982 (1970).
153. 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq. (1970).
154. 42 U.S.C. §2000d et seq. (1970).
155. Comment, Redlining: Remedies for Victims of Urban Disinvestment, 5 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 83, 84 (1976).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 42 U.S.C. §1982 (1970).
159. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
160. Id. at 413.
161. Id. at 422-37.
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was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the 1972 case of District of Colum-
bia v. Carter.162
The Court in Jones made it clear, however, that they did not consider
Section 1982 to be a comprehensive open housing law. 163 The Court said
that unlike the Fair Housing Act of 1968, Section 1982 does not refer
explicitly to discrimination in financing arrangements or in the provision of
brokerage services. 164 Yet in 1973 a federal circuit court held in Baker v. F
& FInvestment Co.' 65 that a cause of action was stated under Section 1982
against the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the Veterans Ad-
ministration (VA) for alleged discriminatory market policies in the adminis-
tration of their home loan mortgage insurance programs. 166 Thus, Section
1982 may be applicable to discrimination in financing arrangements despite
the court's language to the contrary in Jones.
Section 1982 may be useful to California plaintiffs challenging redlining
practices under roughly the same circumstances under which the Unruh
Civil Rights Act may be used. 167 Under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the
plaintiff is entitled to damages of up to three times the amount of actual
damage, but in no case less than $250, plus attorneys fees, 168 while Section
1982 does not provide for an award in addition to actual damages. Thus, in a
particular case, a plaintiff may be better off financially bringing a claim
under the Unruh Civil Rights Act rather than Section 1982. In view of the
more specific language of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and the Rumford
Fair Housing Act, however, it would be unusual for a plaintiff in a redlining
action to rely solely on the Unruh Civil Rights Act or Section 1982.169
b. Fair Housing Act of 1968
The federal Fair Housing Act of 1968 has the broad purpose of providing
comprehensive prohibitions against all forms of housing discrimination,
170
and thus would appear to encompass redlining. 171 Discrimination in the sale
162. 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
163. 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
164. Id.
165. 489 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1973).
166. Id. at 831-32.
167. See text accompanying notes 139-145 supra. Section 1982 is much broader in scope
than the Unruh Civil Rights Act, since the Unruh Act is limited to prohibiting discrimination by
business establishments only, CAL. CIV. CODE §51, but in the redlining context, the discrimina-
tion is being done by financial institutions which are business establishments, so the difference
is not likely to be important.
168. CAL. Civ. CODE §52.
169. Renne, Eliminating Redlining by Judicial Action: Are Erasers Available?, 29 VAND. L.
REv. 987, 999 (1976).
170. See Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735, 740 (6th Cir. 1974).
171. Neither the term "redlining" nor the phenomenon for which it stands appears in the
Fair Housing Act itself, nor was the practice directly confronted during the legislative develop-
ment of the Act. Comment, Urban Housing Finance and the Redlining Controversy, 25 CLEV.
ST. L. REv. 110, 129 (1976). After an extensive examination of the legislative history, however,
the brief for the United States in Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.
Ohio 1976), concluded, "While the legislative history does not specifically address the practice
of redlining by name or direct description, it does reflect an emphatic Congressional rejection
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or rental of housing and discrimination in the financing of housing are
prohibited by Sections 3604 and 3605, respectively, of the Fair Housing
Act. ' 72 These sections would afford the logical basis for a suit challenging
redlining practices. 
173
Section 3604 expressly provides that it shall be unlawful to refuse to sell
or rent, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to a person
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 174 In Laufman v.
Oakley Building and Loan Co., 175 the court stated that with the current high
cost of housing, a denial of financial assistance in connection with a sale of a
home would effectively "make unavailable or deny" a "dwelling.
176
When the denial occurs as a result of racial considerations, Section 3604 is
transgressed. 177
The language of Section 3605 is broader than the language of Section
3604. Section 3605 makes it unlawful for any financial institution1 78 to deny
or discriminate in setting the terms and conditions of a loan for the purpose
of purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a dwell-
ing. 179 The court in Laufman found that the practice of redlining was
prohibited by Section 3605 where the purpose of the loan was to finance the
purchase of a home in an integrated neighborhood. 180 Even though it is a
lower court opinion, the Laufman decision is significant because it is the
first case that expressly held that the practice of racial redlining was
prohibited by the civil rights laws.
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 may 'be used by California plaintiffs
challenging the redlining practices of financial institlitions. Although the
language of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 is very similar to that of the
Rumford Fair Housing Act, it may be advantageous for the California
plaintiff to bring an action under the federal statute rather than filing a
complaint with the Fair Employment Practices Commission. The federal
court in Laufman has shown a willingness to declare redlining practices
unlawful, whereas the Fair Employment Practices Commission might be
reluctant to issue a cease and desist order requiring a financial institution to
make a loan that the institution does not want to make. Thus the Fair
Housing Act of 1968 might be more protective as a practical matter.
of the premise on which the practice is based." Comment, Urban Housing Finance and the
Redlining Controversy, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 110, 129 (1976).
172. 42 U.S.C. §§3604, 3605 (1970).
173. Comment, The Legality of Redlining Under the Civil Rights Laws, 25 Am. U.L. REV.
463, 475 (1976).
174. 42 U.S.C. §3604(a) (1970).
175. 408 F.Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
176. Id. at 493.
177. Id.
178. "Financial institution" is defined as "any bank, building and loan association, insur-
ance company or other corporation, association, firm or enterprise whose business consists in
whole or in part of the making of commercial real estate loans." 42 U.S.C. §3605 (1970).
179. 42 U.S.C. §3605 (1970).
180. 408 F.Supp. 489, 493 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
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c. Civil Rights Act of 1964
Section 2000d of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 181
State financial institutions may receive federal financial assistance from
deposit insurance provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), 8 2 from eligibility for loans and advances due to membership in the
Federal Reserve System, 183 or from guarantees received from the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA), 184 or the Veterans Administration (VA). 185
It would appear, however, that Congress specifically excepted these types of
federal financial assistance from the coverage of Section 2000d by the
enactment of Section 2000d-1 which provides:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to
extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by
way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance
or guarantee is authorized and directed to effect the provisions of
2000d .... 186
The language excluding contracts or guarantees would seem to indicate
that programs or activities which receive federal financial assistance in the
form of insurance or guarantees would be able to discriminate with impunity
as far as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is concerned, while programs or
activities which receive federal financial assistance in other forms would be
subject to the proscriptions of Section 2000d. However, in the Laufman
case, the court held that 2000d and 2000d-1 did prohibit discrimination by a
federally-chartered savings and loan association. 87 Since Oakley was a
federally-chartered association, this may be distinguishable from the case of
a state-chartered institution receiving only insurance or guarantees from
FDIC, FHA, or VA. However, state-chartered financial institutions which
are members of the Federal Reserve System might arguably come within the
prohibitions of Section 2000d, since their membership in the Federal Re-
serve System makes them eligible for loans or advances of federal funds. 188
Thus, the redlining practices of state-chartered financial institutions which
are members of the Federal Reserve System could arguably be challenged
181. 42 U.S.C. §2000d (1970).
182. 12 U.S.C. §§1815, 1816 (1964), §1821 (Supp. 1975).
183. 12 U.S.C. §§321, 347 (Supp. 1975).
184. 12 U.S.C. §1703 (Supp. 1975).
185. 38 U.S.C. §1815 (Supp. 1975).
186. 42 U.S.C. §2000d-I (1970) (emphasis added).
187. 408 F.Supp. 489, 498-99 (S.D. Ohio 1976). In the course of its opinion the court stated
that "[c]learly, Oakley Building and Loan Company is subject to the prohibitions of . . ..
§2000d-l," without really discussing the exception. Id. at 498.
188. 12 U.S.C. §347 (Supp. 1975).
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under Section 2000d of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. State financial
institutions which are not members of the Federal Reserve System but which
receive insurance or guarantees from FDIC, FHA, or VA would appear to
come within the exception stated in Section 2000d-1 and thus the redlining
practices of these institutions could not be challenged under Section 2000d
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
DEFENSE OF BUSINESS NECESSITY
Even though redlining may be challenged as a violation of the regulations
promulgated by the Savings and Loan Commissioner, 189 or as a violation of
state 9° or federal civil rights statutes, 191 a financial institution which can
establish the affirmative defense of "business necessity" may still be
justified in continuing the practice. 192 The rationale of the business necessity
defense is that a practice or policy that is absolutely vital to the proper
functioning of the enterprise may be sustained even in the face of its
discriminatory effect. 19 3 The real extent to which redlining practices can be
controlled in California thus depends on the extent to which business
necessity justifies redlining practices. California has previously recognized
the business necessity defense. 194 The guidelines in the regulations issued by
the Savings and Loan Commissioner, for example, state that no association
shall engage in a policy or practice which has the effect of discriminating
against a protected group 95 "unless the association can demonstrate that
[the] policy or practice is required to achieve an overriding legitimate
business purpose." 196 The guidelines to interpretation of this section pro-
vide that if a practice clearly has the effect of discriminating against a
protected group, the burden shifts to the association to demonstrate that the
practice is required to achieve an overriding legitimate business purpose. 1
97
In determining whether such business purpose exists, the regulations adopt
the same criteria for establishing business necessity that have been used by
the federal courts in housing and employment discrimination cases. 19s These
criteria are:
(1) The business purpose must be an important business pur-
189. See text accompanying notes 85-111 supra.
190. See text accompanying notes 136-151 supra.
191. See text accompanying notes 152-188 supra.
192. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499
F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974).
193. Comment, The Legality of Redlining Under the Civil Rights Laws, 25 AM. U.L. REv.
463, 478 (1976).
194. E.g., 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §246.3(a)(2).
195. "Protected group" in this context includes those who are discriminated against
because of race, color, religion, sex, marital status, national origin or ancestry. 10 CAL. ADMIN.
CODE §246.3(a) (1).
196. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.2(c).
197. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §246.3(a)(2).
198. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Williams v. Matthews Co.,499
F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974).
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pose sufficiently compelling to override any discriminatory im-
pact;
(2) The challenged practice must effectively carry out the
business purpose it is alleged to serve;
(3) There must be available no acceptable alternative policies
or practices which would better accomplish the business purpose
advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser discrimina-
tory impact. 199
The regulations issued by the Savings and Loan Commissioner contain
detailed guidelines for determining whether a discriminatory practice is
required to achieve an overriding legitimate business purpose. 200 Apart from
the regulations, the criteria that will satisfy the defense of business necessity
has developed primarily through case law. Although application of the
criteria in the regulations or the criteria in the case law should yield the same
result in a given case, the criteria from the two sources will be discussed
separately.
A. Business Necessity Criteria Under the Regulations
The regulations issued by the Savings and Loan Commissioner state that
the purpose of the regulations is to prevent discrimination in a manner
"consistent with sound business practice.' '201 In the section of the regula-
tions prohibiting discrimination, moreover, the regulations state that no
association shall engage in redlining, "unless the association can demon-
strate that such consideration in the particular case is required to avoid an
unsafe or unsound business practice. '" 2°  In the subchapter entitled
"Guidelines to Fair Lending," 20 3 the regulations define the conditions,
characteristics, and trends in the neighborhood which the regulatory agency
will consider required to avoid an unsafe or unsound business practice. The
subchapter containing these guidelines, then, contains the criteria which the
regulatory agency will accept as establishing an overriding legitimate busi-
ness purpose.
Two of the factors that the Savings and Loan Commissioner considers
sufficient to justify denial of a loan, although they may result in discrimina-
tion, are the current fair market value of the property 2°4 and any geological
hazards surrounding the property. 2 5 An association may also deny the loan
if it already has an unusually high concentration of loans in that census
tract, °2 6 since diversification of an association's loan portfolio is desirable.
199. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §246.3(a)(2).
200. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §246-246.7.
201. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245(b).
202. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.2(a).
203. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE, Subchapter 24 (commencing with §246).
204. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.3(a).
205. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.3(d).
206. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.3(c).
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However, such a high concentration of loans in a historically redlined area
would be unusual.
The most subjective criterion that an association may use to justify the
denial of a loan, however, is the projection of the "future fair market value"
of the property. 20 7 The regulations provide that if an association can docu-
ment factors that will cause the fair market value to decline during the early
years of the mortgage term, the association may deny the loan or adjust the
terms of the loan and require the borrower to pay a higher down payment, or
higher monthly payments, or both. 20 8 Allowing the associations to base their
lending practices on the future of the neighborhood in which the property is
located, however, involves the subjective judgment of the association in
projecting the future decline of the neighborhood, 20 9 and the institutions are
able to use their own projection to deny the loan or to vary the terms. Even
when the financial institution is allowed only to vary the terms of the
mortgage, this will still have the probable effect of pricing most residents of
redlined areas out of the market, since they are typically the least able to
afford higher down payments or higher monthly payments. Thus, the practi-
cal effect of allowing associations to use the future fair market value of the
property as a justification for denying or varying the terms of a loan, may be
merely to sanction redlining on a more sophisticated level.
210
Thus, business necessity is a viable defense under the Savings and Loan
Commissioner's regulations. The regulations contain an entire subchapter of
guidelines which the associations may use to establish the business necessi-
ty defense.
B. Business Necessity Criteria Under Case Law
Financial institutions generally assert three main reasons for their reluc-
tance to make loans in historically redlined areas: (1) the increased
economic risks which the financial institutions perceive they are taking in
these areas ;211 (2) the fiduciary duty the institutions have to their depositors
and shareholders;212 and (3) the belief that the institutions will be unable to
sell these loans in the secondary mortgage market.213 Each of the considera-
tions advanced by the financial institutions will be examined in light of the
three criteria for establishing business necessity that have been used by the
federal courts in housing and employment discrimination cases. The results
of this examination will determine whether financial institutions will be able
to legally justify redlining practices by using a business necessity defense.
207. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.3(b).
208. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §245.3(b).
209. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, Dec. 5, 1975, at 6.
210. Renne, Eliminating Redlining by Judical Action: Are Erasers Available?, 29 VAND. L.
REV. 987, 1008 (1976).
211. See text accompanying notes 214-250 infra.
212. See text accompanying notes 251-271 infra.
213. See text accompanying notes 272-295 infra.
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1. Perceived Risks
Financial institutions argue that certain economic factors increase their
risks in redlined areas and thus motivate disinvestment. These are: higher
administrative costs on loans and difficulty with loan repayment, 214 a higher
ratio of foreclosures in these areas, 215 and property of inferior quality, which
is poor collateral in the eyes of institutional lenders.216 Each of these factors
will be examined in light of the criteria required to establish a business
necessity defense to determine whether these factors justify redlining prac-
tices by financial institutions.
First, lenders point out that administrative costs are higher on loans in
redlined areas than on loans in other areas.2 17 One reason is that loans in
redlined areas tend to be smaller loans than loans in other areas, and if the
costs for servicing a mortgage in terms of time and paperwork are fixed,
then these costs will represent a larger percentage of a small loan than of a
large loan. 218 Consequently, the smaller loan in a redlined area is relatively
less profitable than a larger loan in another area. Higher administrative costs
may also be incurred on mortgage loans in redlined areas because of the
location of the mortgaged property.2 19 If the property is located in an area
where the threat of vandalism is high, the property may be inspected
periodically by lenders concerned about their investment. To the lender,
such inspections represent outlays of time and money which would be
unnecessary if the property were located elsewhere. 2
Lenders also cite difficulty with loan repayment as a problem with a loan
in a redlined area.2 21 Generally the income levels are lower and unemploy-
ment is higher in these areas.222 Beyond the problem of complete failure to
repay, 223 the lender's costs may be increased by the letters, phone calls, and
other actions required because of delinquent loan payments.
224
In evaluating arguments by financial institutions that increased adminis-
trative costs justify discriminatory practices, it appears that the courts have
balanced the impact of the increased costs on the business against the
importance of the borrower's right not to be discriminated against in his
application for a mortgage loan. 225 The lender's increased administrative
214. Comment, The Legality of Redlining Under the Civil Rights Laws, 25 AM. U.L. REv.
463, 467 (1976).
215. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 2, at 10-11.
216. Comment, The Legality of Redlining Under the Civil Rights Laws, 25 AM. U.L. REV.
463, 468 (1976).





222. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 2, at 10.
223. See text accompanying note 227 infra.
224. Comment, The Legality of Redlining Under the Civil Rights Laws, 25 AM, U.L. REv.
463, 467 (1976).
225. See id. at 482.
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costs include: (1) time and paperwork costs that represent a higher percent-
age of a small loan than of a large loan; (2) inspection costs due to the
location of the property; and (3) costs for letters, phone calls, and other
actions required because of delinquent loan payments. These costs would all
appear to be minimal, however, and the loan in a redlined area is neverthe-
less profitable for the financial institution. Thus, in order for the business
purpose involved to be sufficiently compelling to override any discrimina-
tory impact, lenders would have to show evidence of a substantial loss, as
opposed to minimum unprofitability, from previous lending in areas now
redlined.226
Second, lenders point to the higher ratio of foreclosures in redlined areas
as a disadvantage of making loans in these areas. 227 Lenders state that their
losses on foreclosed properties have been substantial. 228 When there is a
foreclosure, the property is often vandalized, and plumbing fixtures, electri-
cal fixtures, doors, and other articles are removed from the premises,
thereby requiring a substantial investment by the financial institution to
rehabilitate the property to bring it up to code and make it saleable.
229
Lenders also claim that these foreclosed properties have little or no resale
value. 230 Furthermore, lenders in California cannot, for all practical pur-
poses, seek deficiency judgements from borrowers when there is a foreclo-
sure and resale of property. 231 Consequently, the foreclosure results in a loss
to the lender. Lenders emphasize, then, that when they are initially granting
loans, they must seek property with reasonable marketability.
232
Even if lenders can show that they will have substantial losses on fore-
closed property in redlined areas, the lenders must still show that there is no
alternative to redlining with a less discriminatory impact in order to establish
the defense of business necessity. 23 3 It can be argued that there are three
alternatives to redlining that would not only have a less discriminatory
impact than redlining, but would also aid in reducing the foreclosure rate to
a point where the institution's losses would no longer be substantial. These
are: (1) revision of the institution's policy for allowing forbearance payment
once an individual misses a mortgage payment; (2) creation of mortgage
counseling programs; and (3) placement of greater emphasis on the charac-
teristics of the borrower in the initial underwriting process.
226. Id.
227. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 2, at 10-11.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Comment, Urban Housing Finance and the Redlining Controversy, 25 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 110, 116 (1976).
231. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 2, at 4. California law bars
deficiency judgments where the property was financed by a purchase money mortgage, CAL.
CODE CiV. PROC. §580b, and where the property is sold pursuant to a power of sale in either a
mortgage or a deed of trust. CAL. CODE CIV. !aoc. §580d.
232. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 2, at 4.
233. See text accompanying note 199 supra.
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Allowing forbearance payments once an individual misses a mortgage
payment could greatly reduce the institution's mortgage foreclosure rate.
Testimony at the Redline Hearings revealed that, currently, if a borrower is
three months behind in payments and it can be shown that the individual can
have his payments current within six months, the institution still will not
postpone foreclosure.2 34 If the financial institution stands to lose substantial-
ly from the foreclosure itself, it would seem that the institution has nothing
to lose in allowing the individual to catch up. By allowing the borrower to
keep his home and the institution to get its money, this alternative would
seem to be better in the long run for both the borrower and the financial
institution.
Another alternative to redlining would be the creation of a mortgage
counseling program for delinquent borrowers or for all borrowers in poten-
tially redlined communities. Several of these programs have been under-
taken in California on an experimental basis. 235 One such counseling pro-
gram in Oakland was shown to reduce the delinquency ratio from a national
average of around 16 percent for the type of loan involved to approximately
1.5 percent. 236 Establishment of counseling programs is, therefore, another
alternative to redlining that could substantially reduce the financial institu-
tion's losses, and at the same time be beneficial for both the borrower and
the lender.
A third alternative to redlining would be to place more emphasis on the
borrower in the initial underwriting process, even though the lender must
ultimately look to the security of the property itself. In proposing this
alternative to redlining, the president of a savings and loan association 237 has
pointed out that the whole system of mortgage lending has become a bit
dehumanizing and suggested a more personal interaction between the bor-
rower and the financial institution. 38 His contention is that if the institution
underwrites a loan based on a personal knowledge and understanding of the
borrower, then the lender has done the single most important thing it can do
to control loss in single-family lending. 239 The theory behind this approach
is that if the borrower does not default on the mortgage payments, then there
will be no foreclosure. This "personalization" theory may also help explain
the success of counseling programs, since through counseling, the institu-
234. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 2, at 37.
235. E.g., Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 27, 1975, no. 3 at 30 (Oakland); L.A.
Times, Jan. 16, 1977, §VII, at 1, col. 5, at 16, col. 1. In discussing the need for mortgage
counseling, Richard Farrer, President of the California Association of Realtors, points out that
when you talk about people having competency to drive an automobile, it seems reasonable that
they have to pass some kind of test in order to have a license. But we are willing to give people
$20,000 or $25,000, put them inside of a single-family home and just let them sink because we
never took the time to explain to them what their responsibilities are. Redline Hearings, supra
note 7, June 23, 1975, at 77.
236. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 27, 1975, no. 3, at 30.
237. Larry Ulvestad, President of Anaheim Savings and Loan.
238. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 27, 1975, no. 3, at 23.
239. Id. at 19.
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tion not only communicates specific information, but also shows an interest
in and becomes familar with the borrower.
Therefore, there are three alternatives to redlining that might aid in
reducing the foreclosure rate that lenders have been experiencing in redlined
areas. Since each of these alternative policies would have a less discrimina-
tory impact than redlining itself, it would appear that the high rate of
foreclosures experienced in redlined areas could not be used to establish
business necessity as a defense.
Finally, in justifing their redlining practices, financial institutions assert
that the inferior quality of property in redlined areas makes it poor collateral
in the eyes of institutional lenders .240 Lenders state that the typical property
in a redlined area is far below the quality and maintenance levels of
suburban property.241 Lenders also assert that property in redlined areas is
old, has few amenities, and is subject to extensive repair and vandalisms.
242
The borrower's inability to keep up with maintenance is a real problem,
since if the local housing and health officials put pressure on the borrower to
bring the property up to standard and he cannot come up with the money, the
property will be demolished, 243 thereby destroying the lender's security for
the loan.
Many lending institutions also consider a neighborhood undergoing racial
transition to be one without stable property values .244 The underlying basis
of long-term financing is stability over an equivalent period of years, and for
this reason, areas in transition are often suspect to potential lenders.
245
Although this fear of lower property values caused by racial mixing seems to
be entrenched in the minds of lenders and consumers alike, the causal
relationship between racial mixing and property value instability is not
supported by hard evidence. In fact, studies show that racial mixing itself
has no appreciable effect on property values.
246
Lenders also point out that the proximity to the security property of
abandoned buildings plus the increased likelihood of arson in abandoned
buildings may weaken the security for a loan that is afforded by the
property.247 There is really not much question that the present condition of a
neighborhood has an effect on the value of the security property, and that as
a matter of sound business judgement, the financial institution should
consider such factors as abandoned buildings in close proximity to the




243. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 2, at 15.
244. Duncan, Hood, & Neet, Redlining Practices, Racial Resegregation, and Urban Decay:
Neighborhood Housing Services as a Viable Alternative, 7 URB. LAW. 510, 515 (1975).
245. Id. at 518.
246. Id. at 516-17.
247. Comment, Urban Housing Finance and the Redlining Controversy, 25 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 110, 133 (1976).
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property as a factor in determining the property's value. However, the
essence of redlining is the lender's projection of the economic future of a
neighborhood and the subsequent refusal to make loans based on that
projection.24 When financial institutions classify these areas as high risk,
that prediction is simply too likely to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 249
Once a financial institution decides that an area is likely to become run-
down, it will become run-down 250 because there will be no money available
in that area to keep property from declining or to make improvements.
Therefore, it would seem that the present inferior quality of property in a
redlined area would constitute sufficient justification for a financial institu-
tion to refuse to make a loan based on business necessity. However, if
financial institutions are allowed to use their own subjective judgment in
projecting the future decline of the neighborhood, and are then allowed to
use this projection as a basis for refusal to grant the loan, the practical result
may be to merely sanction redlining on a more sophisticated level. Accord-
ingly, courts that are balancing the interests of the financial institution
against the interests of the borrower in a redlined area should find that the
possibility of future risk on the part of the financial institution would not
outweigh the certainty of discriminatory impact if the defense of business
necessity is allowed. Financial institutions, then, arguably would not be able
to establish the defense of business necessity based on the projected decline
of a redlined neighborhood because their interest would not be sufficiently
compelling to override any discriminatory impact.
Thus, it would appear that even though the economic factors of increased
administrative costs, difficulty with loan repayment, higher ratios of fore-
closures, and inferior housing quality do exist with loans in redlined areas,
the defense of business necessity still cannot be used to justify discrimina-
tory lending practices that are based on these factors. The lender's increased
administrative costs and difficulty with loan repayment cannot be used to
constitute business necessity, since these increased costs indicate only that
loans in redlined areas are relatively less profitable than loans in other areas.
In order for the business purpose involved to be sufficiently compelling to
override any discriminatory impact, lenders would have to show evidence of
a substantial loss, as opposed to minimum unprofitability, from previous
lending in areas now redlined. The lender's higher ratios of foreclosures in
redlined areas also cannot be used to constitute business necessity, since
there are alternatives to redlining which have a less discriminatory impact on
the borrower. The inferior housing quality that exists in many redlined areas
could be used to constitute the defense of business necessity as long as the
institution bases its decision on the present inferior quality rather than the
248. See text accompanying note 209 supra.
249. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 1, at 5.
250. Id.
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projected inferior quality of the property. When the financial institution
claims that the quality of the property will be inferior at some future point in
time, the institution has only a possiblity of future risk if the loan is actually
made. The financial institution's interest in protecting itself from this possi-
bility of future risk is arguably not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the
certainty of discriminatory impact if the defense of business necessity were
allowed.
2. Fiduciary Duty as Corporate Directors
The lending institutions point out that they have a fiduciary duty to their
depositors and shareholders, and that they can neither legally nor economi-
cally extend credit when the prospects for loss exceed the prospects for
gain.251 The lenders assert that to do so would constitute an unsafe and
unsound business practice in the eyes of the regulatory agencies. 252 The
lending institutions thus argue that their fiduciary253 responsibility to their
depositors and shareholders constitutes the defense of business necessity and
keeps them from being able to make more loans in redlined areas.
With regard to the fiduciary obligations of officers and directors of
financial institutions, however, the question arises whether the directors
owe a duty solely to the depositors and investors of that institution, or
whether there is a further duty to the community from which the institution
draws its depositors and to the welfare of that community. 254 Given the
choice between a very safe loan and a risky loan, is the financial institution
compelled to take part in some of the risky loans for social betterment?
2 55
The financial industry is convinced that making more loans in redlined
areas would mean the neglect of their duty to their depositors and sharehold-
ers. 6 They contend that depositors are guaranteed an annual interest rate in
return for their deposits. In order to insure that they will be financially able
to pay this annual interest rate, the financial institutions must invest the
depositor's dollars within reasonable bounds.257 The officers and directors
also have a duty to the shareholders to invest the institution's funds in
ventures where a reasonable rate of return on the money may be expected.
258
Financial institutions recognize that, to a certain extent, the public interest
251. Id. at 26-27.
252. Id.
253. Directors of a corporation, while not strictly trustees, are fiduciaries, and occupy a
fiduciary relationship to the corporation and its shareholders. Hence, it is their duty to promote
the best interests of the shareholders and the corporation. See, e.g., Brown v. North Ventura
Road Dev. Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d 227, 232-33, 30 Cal. Rptr. 568, 571 (1963); Remillard Brick Co.
v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 419, 241 P.2d 66, 74 (1952).
254. Earthman, Residential Mortgage Lending: Charting a Course Through the Regulatory
Maze, 29 VAND. L. REv. 957, 984 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Earthman].
255. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 23, 1975, at 4.
256. Comment, Urban Housing Finance and the Redlining Controversy, 25 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 110, 116 (1976).
257. See Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 2, at 2.
258. See id.
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lies in their making more loans in redlined areas.2 59 But the lenders maintain
that the state cannot mandate that they risk the depositor's funds for the sake
of another social need. The lenders maintain that it is society's risk as
differentiated from the depositor's risk.
260
The argument that directors are fiduciaries and must act in the best
interests of their depositors ignores the fact that it may well be the depositors
themselves who are being denied mortgage money. Most savings and loan
associations are mutually owned, and this mutual ownership envisions
participation by persons who are in the savings and loan association's
primary service area. 261 Residents of an area seeking mortgage financing
might therefore tend to start at either a neighborhood financial institution or
at one where they are already a depositor. It can hardly be said to be in the
best interest of a depositor to take his money, but refuse to return it in the
form of mortgage loans.
If mortgage loan availability is one of the returns that a depositor may
reasonably expect from a financial institution, then it would appear that the
institution's fiduciary duty to its depositors could not be used to justify
redlining practices. Under these circumstances, the fiduciary duty would not
satisfy the criteria required to constitute business necessity because it does
not effectively carry out the purpose it is alleged to serve.
262
Apart from the status of the borrower as a depositor, however, the
institution violates its duty to its depositors and shareholders only if it makes
decisions which jeopardize the fiscal soundness of the institution. Discus-
sion in the previous section indicated that any practice that can be shown to
result in a substantial loss to the institution, as opposed to minimal unprof-
itability, could be avoided by the defense of business necessity.2 63 Accord-
ingly, under the regulations and under the statutes which may be used to
challenge redlining practices, the financial institutions would not be re-
quired to make loans that would jeopardize the fiscal soundess of the
institution.
The institutions can best fulfill their fiduciary obligations to their de-
positors and shareholders by looking for the least discriminatory alternative
that complies with laws applicable to redlining" and yet still allows them to
provide a reasonable return on the institution's dollar. There are several such
alternatives to outright denial of loans in redlined areas which would allow
the directors to fulfill their duties to their depositors and shareholders, yet
which would have a less discriminatory impact on residents of redlined
areas. One such alternative to loan denial is the creation of an assigned risk
pool similar to that used in auto insurance for people who would otherwise
259. See Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 23, 1975, at 36.
260. Id.
261. See Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 1, at 25.
262. See text accompanying note 199 supra.
263. See text accompanying note 226 supra.
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be considered uninsurable by the insurance companies. 2 4 Under this pro-
gram each financial institution would put a certain amount of money into the
pool and make a certain number of loans in redlined areas, and then all
participating lenders would share any losses proportionately rather than
allowing the loss to fall totally on any one lender. 265 This alternative seems
to have been embraced voluntarily by many California financial institutions,
since there are currently 27 lending institutions in California that pooled
over $30 million over a three-year period in a program of this type. 266 This
type of program has barely scratched the surface of the need in California,
but at least it is a beginning.
267
The question remains whether directors owe a duty solely to the de-
positors and investors of that institution, or whether there is a further duty to
the community from which the institution draws its depositors and to the
welfare of that community. At the Redline Hearings, witnesses indicated
that local financial institutions do have a legal responsibility to the com-
munity in which they were chartered. 268 These witnesses find support for
their position in statutory language indicating that applications for new
charters must include information on whether there is a "necessity for the
proposed association in the community to be served by it. "269 They reason
that if the institution was chartered to fulfill a need in a particular communi-
ty, then the institution is under a legal obligation to fulfill the financial needs
of that community. Financial industry spokesmen, on the other hand,
contend that these statutes impose neither an explicit nor an implicit duty on
financial institutions to invest in specific neighborhoods. 270 Rather, the
investment decision is left to the determination of the institutions themselves
on the basis of demands for mortgage funds and the exercise of sound
business judgment evaluating risks and potential profitability.271
It would appear that the statutes governing charter requirements for
financial institutions do not expressly create an affirmative duty to lend in
the area in which the institution is located. However, the institution is
legally prohibited from redlining, and the institution can be expected to
receive more applications for financial assistance from the area in which it is
located than from other areas. Consequently, complete failure of the institu-
tion to lend in the area in which it is located might be an indication that
redlining is occurring, and might be cause for inquiry into the institution's
lending policies. Financial institutions would not be able to justify their
264. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 27, 1975, no. 3, at 28-29.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 23, 1975, at 15.
268. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, written testimony submitted by Merle Mergell,
Mayor, City of Inglewood, California, at 4.
269. Id.
270. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 1, at 23.
271. Id. at 23-24.
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failure to lend in redlined areas, then, on the basis of their fiduciary duty to
their shareholders and depositors for several reasons. First, mortgage loans
may be one of the returns for his deposit that a depositor may reasonably
expect from a financial institution. If so, the institution's fiduciary duty to
its depositors could not be used to constitute business necessity since it
would not effectively carry out the purpose it is alleged to serve. Second, the
institution would be violating its duty to its depositors and shareholders only
if they make decisions which jeopardize the fiscal soundness of the institu-
tion. Making loans in redlined areas would not necessarily create such
jeopardy. Third, the financial institutions cannot use their fiduciary duty to
depositors and shareholders to constitute the defense of business necessity
because there are alternatives to redlining such as assigned risk pools, that
would have a less discriminatory impact on residents of redlined areas.
Finally, although the financial institution probably does not have an affirma-
tive duty to lend in the area in which it is located, in addition to its duty to its
depositors and shareholders, complete failure to make loans in that area may
indicate that redlining is occurring, and may be cause for scrutiny of the
institution's lending policies.
3. Access to Secondary Mortgage Market
Financial institutions rely heavily on their ability to sell mortgages in the
secondary mortgage market, and the institutions claim that loans made in
redlined areas cannot be sold in this market. a72 The institutions maintain that
this lack of access to the secondary mortgage market for loans made in
redlined areas constitutes the defense of business necessity.
The secondary mortgage market is generally a place where mortgages can
be bought and sold. 73 There are currently three quasi-governmental agen-
cies that provide a secondary mortgage market: the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (known as "Freddie Mac"),274 the Government
National Mortgage Association ("Ginnie Mae"),275 and the Federal Nation-
al Mortgage Corporation ("Fannie Mae"). 276 The purpose of the secondary
mortgage market is to provide a place where financial institutions can make
loans to the borrower and handle the bulk of real estate closings, and then
sell the mortgage to one of the three agencies in the secondary mortgage
market. After the mortgage is sold, the financial institution that made the
loan generally retains the servicing of the mortgage, which includes any
further communication with the borrower.
277
272. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 2, at 11.
273. Earthman, supra note 254, at 973-74.
274. Id. at 974. Freddie Mac is a private agency created by the Emergency Home Finance
Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. §§1451-1459 (1970).
275. Earthman, supra note 254, at 976. Ginnie Mae is a corporate instrumentality of the
federal government within HUD. Id.
276. Id. Fannie Mae is privately owned and holds the largest residential mortgage portfolio
in the world. Id.
277. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 2, at 25.
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The ability to sell loans in the secondary mortgage market has several
advantages.2 78 First, the funds generated from the sale can be committed
once again to the residential market, thus increasing the number of residen-
tial mortgage loans made. Second, the ability to sell loans in the secondary
mortgage market provides and allows better utilization of the institution's
available capital.
Financial institutions maintain that they are virtually unable to sell loans
made in redlined areas in the secondary mortgage market. 279 One reason is
that the secondary market agencies are more reluctant to lend in redlined
areas than the local financial institutions are, because the secondary market
agencies do not know the areas as well as the neighborhood lenders do.
280
Another obstacle to selling loans in the secondary market is that enabling
legislation for the secondary market agencies provides that the type of loans
that can be purchased should be the type that are normally made and meet
the quality normally made by institutional investors. 281 Consequently, finan-
cial institutions say it would be contrary to the legislative mandate of these
agencies to take conventional loans that are not of normal underwriting
quality.282 Furthermore, the regulations applicable to the secondary mort-
gage market have very specific repurchase provisions under which the
financial institution could be forced to repurchase any mortgages made in
violation of the secondary market's regulations.283 The forced repurchase of
mortgages would obviously have a very detrimental effect on financial
institutions.
Thus, since every financial institution depends to some extent on the
secondary mortgage market, the institutions claim that out of business
necessity, they must comply with the regulations that preserve their access
to that market.284 In other words, lenders are arguing that they can only
make loans that they know they can sell in the secondary market and that, in
this sense, they are only loan processing agents. 285 In fact, the financial
institutions assert that no government insurance is available for loans in
redlined areas, since FHA and VA also engage in redlining, 286 and that the
secondary mortgage market will not participate in these areas because they
consider it "high-risk lending." 287 The financial institutions therefore con-
tend that mortgages in redlined areas cannot even be considered to be liquid
assets of the institutions.
288
278. Earthman, supra note 254, at 983.
279. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 2, at 11.
280. Id. at 6.
281. Id. at 25-26.
282. Id. at 26.
283. Earthman, supra note 254, at 984.
284. See id.
285. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 1, at 28.
286. E.g., Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 1, at 16. See Redline
Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 2, at 9.
287. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 2, at 11.
288. Id.
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There is evidence, however, that the three agencies involved in the
secondary mortgage market do not all engage in redlining, or at least not all
to the same degree.2 89 "Freddie Mac" may engage in redlining most
blatantly, since their regulations provide that in determining an acceptable
term of years for a mortgage, the original term may not exceed 30 years, "or
such lesser term as is appropriate, given the character, age, and location of
the mortgage premises.' '29 Thus, tacit recognition is made that some
locations are less desirable than others, and that in such instances, appropri-
ate modifications may be made to the terms of any loan on property located
in the area. 29' The regulations for "Fannie Mae" also refer to the necessary
evaluation of the "neighborhood" for use in appraising the premises being
considered for a mortgage. 292 The regulations allow the appraiser to consid-
er the impact of social and economic characteristics of the neighborhood
which are likely to affect the value of the security property.293 However, the
appraiser is directed to report detrimental neighborhood conditions "in
factual specific terms by giving the address of the affected properties and an
exact description of the nature of the conditions involved in each case.'"294
Thus, it appears to be the intent of "Fannie Mae" to require an individual
analysis on a premises-by-premises basis, rather than to allow sweeping
generalizations that could adversely affect the making of loans to the entire
neighborhood.295
If "Fannie Mae" does not in fact engage in redlining, then the financial
institution's asserted inability to sell loans in the secondary mortgage market
may not be convincing. At a minimum, it would seem that financial
institutions should be required to make loans in redlined areas which they
consider to be sound loans, and then attempt to sell these loans in the
secondary market. At the present time, financial institutions are attempting
to justify their reluctance to make any loans in redlined areas on the grounds
that if such loans were made, the institutions would be unable to sell them in
the secondary mortgage market. The agencies in the secondary market
should at least be put to the test to see whether their former redlining
practices would continue in the face of increased lending by local financial
institutions.
It would thus seem that the financial institutions could not use limited
access to the secondary mortgage market to constitute the defense of busi-
ness necessity. If "Fannie Mae" does not engage in redlining or engages in
redlining to a lesser extent than the other agencies in the secondary mortgage
289. See Earthman, supra note 254, at 975, 977.
290. Id. at 975.
291. Id.
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market, then attempting to sell mortgages in redlined areas to "Fannie
Mae" may be an alternative to redlining that would have a less discrimina-
tory impact on borrowers in redlined areas than the presumed inability to sell
mortgages in the secondary market.
GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
Even though financial institutions concede that increased lending activity
in redlined areas is necessary if the continued decline of these areas is to be
averted,296 they are nevertheless reluctant to increase the extent of their
lending unless the government agrees to participate with them in any losses
that may occur. Financial institutions emphasize that the responsibility for
the decline of redlined neighborhoods is shared, and maintain that it would
be unjust to require the financial industry alone to bear the entire financial
burden of restoring these communities. 297 The financial industry contends
that a cooperative effort between government and private industry is the
only way to effectively stop the deterioration of California's neighbor-
hoods. 298 In response to this concern by the financial industry, the state has
begun to participate with financial institutions in increasing the extent of
mortgage lending in redlined areas.
The financial industry was particularly anxious that the state provide
mortgage insurance for loans made in redlined areas.299 The financial
industry requested that the state provide a mortgage insurance agency that
would participate in any losses should they occur. 300 In response to this
request, the Housing Rehabilitation Insurance Fund was established on
September 26, 1975.301 The law creating the fund authorizes the California
Housing Finance Agency to conduct a loan insurance program to insure
loans made by the Agency or by qualified mortgage lenders.30 2 It was the
intent of the legislature in creating this fund to establish a program of loan
insurance to encourage and facilitate the preservation of existing housing
and improve housing opportunities for persons and families of low or
moderate income. 303 In administering the fund, the Agency will hold public
hearings and establish priorities for the allocation of loan-insurance assist-
ance among eligible areas throughout the state.
304
296. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 27, 1975, no. 3, at 27.
297. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 23, 1975, at 48.
298. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 2, at 3.
299. Id. at 11.
300. Id.
301. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §42000.
302. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §42062. Insurance may be provided for loans for
rehabilitation, refinancing in connection with rehabilitation, acquisition of residences, or con-
struction or mortgage financing. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §42062.
303. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §42001. The Housing Rehabilitation Insurance Fund
was created by a five million dollar appropriation from the General Fund. This money must be
repaid to the General Fund by Jan. 1, 1986. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §42080. The
operating expenses of administering the fund and the money to be repaid to the General Fund
will come from insurance premiums which the Agency will add to the interest rates of insured
loans. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §42065.
304. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §42045.
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The Agency typically will not insure loans for 100 percent of the out-
standing indebtedness, but will only share with private lenders in any losses
that may occur. 305 Most loans will be insured "only for such percentage of
the amount of risk as the agency determines is necessary to induce approved
lending institutions to make such loans.' '306
Through its Housing Rehabilitation Insurance program, the state will
share with private lending institutions the risk of lending in previously
redlined areas. By this method, private lenders are now able to get back into
previously redlined areas without some of the risk that would otherwise be
involved if the state were not participating. One consumer group has pointed
out that a financial institution's initial investment in a redlined area is very
important, because once the lending institutions have a significant financial
stake in these neighborhoods, the problems associated with redlining may
quickly disappear.
30 7
In addition to its involvement in the mortgage insurance area, the Housing
Finance Agency was created to make mortgage financing available in
geographical areas in which private lenders have been unable or unwilling to
commit sufficient funds for residential lending.308 Basically, the Housing
Finance Agency is designed to stimulate lending by private financial institu-
tions by contracting with mortgage lenders for the initiation and servicing of
mortgage loans, 309 by lending funds to mortgage lenders and requiring the
proceeds to be used to finance housing developments,
310 or by purchasing311
or insuring 312 loans made by mortgage lenders for financing or refinancing
housing developments. Rather than making mortgage loans itself, the Hous-
ing Finance Agency is really designed to act as a catalyst to encourage the
investment of private capital in the housing market in a public/private
partnership.
313
The state's creation of the Housing Rehabilitation Insurance Fund and the
Housing Finance Agency indicates that the government is responsive to
requests by the financial industry for finding solutions to the problems of
redlining. This responsiveness demonstrates that the state is willing to do its
part to end redlining in California.
305. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §42061.
306. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §42061.
307. Redline Hearings, supra note 7, June 16, 1975, no. 1, at 20.
308. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41003(c). The primary purpose of the Agency is to
meet the housing needs of low or moderate income persons and families. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §41331.
309. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41388.
310. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §41465.
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313. Senator George N. Zenovich, Press Release, June 30, 1975, at 2 (copy on file at the
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CONCLUSION
It is clear that redlining is practiced by financial institutions in California,
and that the resultant lack of mortgage financing has caused or contributed
to the deterioration of residential neighborhoods. It is also clear that the
availability of home loans is essential to the preservation of California's
existing housing stock. To determine the full extent of the redlining problem
in California, however, there must be disclosure by financial institutions of
what their lending practices actually are. Although data has been collected
by agencies regulating the financial institutions for some time, the informa-
tion is inadequate to establish an accurate lending profile. To remedy that
inadequacy, California has recently taken several steps to require further
disclosure by financial institutions. Regulations were adopted by the Sav-
ings and Loan Commissioner requiring public disclosure of data on all loans
made by state-licensed savings and loan associations after August 1, 1976.
In addition to requiring public disclosure, the regulations require disclosure
to the individual loan applicant of information designed to enable the
applicant to determine whether he has been the victim of discriminatory
lending practices.
The Department of Housing and Community Development was given
responsibility for developing a California Statewide Housing Plan that will
contain an evaluation and summary of housing conditions throughout the
state. The Department of Housing and Community Development was also
directed to establish a statewide housing information system, and was given
authority to provide a statistics and research service for the collection and
dissemination of information affecting housing and community develop-
ment.
Although California now has very extensive disclosure requirements for
financial institutions, there may be some problem in disseminating available
information to interested consumers. Thus, in order for a truly comprehen-
sive picture of mortgage lending practices in California to emerge, it is
recommended that all data related to housing finance be collected and
disseminated through one central source, the Department of Housing and
Community Development.
In addition to obtaining data on redlining practices, California borrowers
can also challenge the legality of the redlining practices of financial institu-
tions. Although a variety of legislation has been introduced in California
that was designed to make redlining illegal, there is currently no statute in
California that expressly makes redlining illegal. However, redlining by
state-chartered savings and loan associations is prohibited by regulations
issued by the Savings and Loan Commissioner that were effective August 1,
1976. The redlining practices of any financial institution may also be
challenged under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Rumford Fair Housing
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Act, or under three federal civil rights statutes: the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Even if a violation of a state or federal statute is found, however, a
financial institution which can establish the affirmative defense of business
necessity may still be justified in continuing the practice. The rationale of
the business necessity defense is that a practice or policy which is absolutely
vital to the proper functioning of the enterprise may be sustained even in the
face of its discriminatory effect. The real extent to which redlining practices
may be controlled in California thus depends on the extent to which business
necessity justifies redlining practices.
The financial institution's reluctance to make loans in historically red-
lined areas is generally based on three main considerations: the increased
economic risks which the financial institutions perceive they are taking in
these areas, the fiduciary duty the institutions have to their depositors and
shareholders, and the belief that they will be unable to sell these loans in the
secondary mortgage market. However, it is arguable that none of these
considerations is sufficient to constitute the defense of business necessity,
because in every case there are alternatives to redlining that would accom-
plish the financial institution's purpose in making the loan but would have a
less discriminatory impact on borrowers in redlined areas.
Financial institutions have also emphasized that they are not solely re-
sponsible for the decline of redlined neighborhoods and the institutions have
requested a cooperative effort between government and private industry in
attempting to stop the deterioration of California's neighborhoods. In re-
sponse to this request by the financial industry, California has created the
Housing Rehabilitation Insurance Fund to insure loans made by private
lenders in redlined areas and the Housing Finance Agency to act as a catalyst
to encourage the investment of private capital in redlined areas.
Thus, both the State of California and the private financial institutions are
taking steps to eliminate redlining in California. Through this public/private
partnership, it is hoped that the further deterioration of California's urban
neighborhoods can be effectively controlled.
Dawn H. Cole
